The Dulles-Hromadka Encounter Revisited: Two Churchmen Anticipated some Current World Changes by Bock, Paul
Occasional Papers on Religion in Eastern Europe
Volume 11 | Issue 3 Article 3
5-1991
The Dulles-Hromadka Encounter Revisited: Two




Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.georgefox.edu/ree
Part of the Christianity Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by Digital Commons @ George Fox University. It has been accepted for inclusion in Occasional
Papers on Religion in Eastern Europe by an authorized administrator of Digital Commons @ George Fox University.
Recommended Citation
Bock, Paul (1991) "The Dulles-Hromadka Encounter Revisited: Two Churchmen Anticipated some Current World Changes,"
Occasional Papers on Religion in Eastern Europe: Vol. 11: Iss. 3, Article 3.
Available at: http://digitalcommons.georgefox.edu/ree/vol11/iss3/3
THE DULLES-HROMADKA ENCOUNTER REVISITED 
Two Churchmen Anticipated some Current World Changes 
by Paul Bock 
Dr. Paul Bock, retired Professor of Religion at Doane College, Crete, Nebraska, is 
author of In Search of a Responsible World Society: The Social Teachings of The 
World Council of Churches (Philadelphia: Westminster Press, 1974). He is a member 
of OPREE's Advisory Editorial Board. 
In 1948, not long after the "iron curtain" had fallen, the World Council of Churches held 
its first assembly in Amsterdam, Holland. To portray the church as a body that transcends 
political differences, the Council leaders invited two speakers, one from each side of the 
curtain, to address the assembly on the day reserved for deliberation about international 
relations. For the representative from the West they chose John Foster Dulles, the prominent 
Presbyterian layman and international lawyer who had provided dynamic leadership for the 
Federal Council of Churches' wartime study on "A Just and Durable Peace." For the 
representative from the East they chose Dr. Josef L. Hromadka, noted East European 
theologian from Prague, who was taking a positive attitude toward the Communist 
government in his country. 
Now in 1990, not long after the "iron curtain" has been lifted, it is worthwhile to look 
again at the statements made by churchmen from the two power blocs in the early years of 
the cold war. Their speeches at Amsterdam were considerations of longer articles published 
in the preparatory materials for the assembly under the general title "Christian Responsibility 
in our Divided World."1 
It is worth noting that there were a number of points where the thoughts of the two men 
converged. Both favored peaceful co-existence and peaceful competition, and both wished 
to avoid war. Both acknowledged weaknesses in the western heritage along with its strengths. 
Both recognized the Church's unique role in creating conditions conductive to peace and 
justice. Both foresaw the possibilities of changes in Communist countries. Yet along with 
these agreements, they voiced significant differences. 
1"Christian Responsibility in Our Divided World," in The Church and International Disorder, in 
the series Man's Disorder and God's Design (New York:Harpers, 1948), pp.73-142. 
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Dulles saw the hope of the future in reliance on moral law. He believed that this law was 
respected only in the western world and that it was most clearly embodied in the U.S. 
constitution and in the U.N. charter, the latter of which he helped to write. He lauded the 
free society which in its political form would be democracy but which could take on a 
variety of economic forms. He anticipated the emergence of many more free societies as 
colonies were becoming independent of their European masters. He believed that Germany, 
Japan Italy, and China could develop into free societies. "A survey of the globe," he said, 
"shows that it is possible for upwards of three-quarters of the human race to develop 
peacefully and quickly-- say within one or two generations-- the use of free institutions." 
In retrospect we can see that, except for China, his anticipations were confirmed. 
But totalitarian societies, in his view, did not rest on moral law. He was referring now 
especially to Communist countries. In those lands the end justified any means, particularly 
violence. He presented sharp c.qntrasts between Soviet practices and Christian values. 
He acknowledged that the success of Communism was rooted in failures of western 
societies and called not for defense of the status quo but for peaceful reform. He predicted 
a change in the Soviet Union if justice through peaceful means is achieved in other nations. 
The following statement seems to fit the events in the late 1980s: "That demonstration 
(eradicating evil by peaceful means) is already gaining momentum, and as that momentum 
grows, the Soviet menace will become innocuous and Soviet leaders themselves will probably 
abandon, or at least definitely postpone, their efforts to produce change by violent means. 
Probably the will not do so as a matter of conviction, for the conception of violent change 
is deeply ingrained. But they can be expected to alter their tactics as soon as there will no 
longer be available to them in different countries of the world sufficient support for 
successful revolutionary measures. Soviet leaders are realists." 
It seems apparent that what Dulles said about possible change in the Soviet Union has 
been realized to a large extent under Gorbachev's leadership. And it also seems apparent that 
it was the development of dynamic free societies and the competition they presented that 
caused the change to take place. In his speech of 1948 Dulles said nothing about defeating 
the Russians through an arms race. He deprecated the emphasis on the military. He was not 
then the militant cold warrior that he became later as Secretary of State. He looked forward 
to European economic and political unity and expressed hope that atomic energy would be 
brought under international control. While the first hope has been partially realized, the 
second obviously has not. 
Josef Hromadka was more forthright in pointing to the failure of the West and to the 
depth of the world crisis. To him World War I, the harsh peace treaty, and World War II 
were all signs of the weaknesses and frailties of the modern, free, civilized society. "The 
whole human race is sick," he said. The cure according to Hromadka, was for the west to 
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acknowledge its weaknesses and to adjust itself to cooperation with the Communist 
movement, which was engaged in an important social transformation, even though the 
Communists came to the hour of decision in the guise of "new barbarians." 
He saw the United States and Soviet Union as newcomers just entering the stage of world 
architects. He saw America as a nation which was a projection of the Western Christian and 
humanistic tradition with its emphasis on human dignity, freedom of the human personality, 
etc. But he said that many in the world see America as a symbol of power and money, no 
longer the promised land of freedom and progress. He expressed hope that the West would 
recover and renew its heritage, but he found widespread doubt. "Its not a material, economic 
interest on the part of the 'big' industries and financial concerns looming behind all the high­
sounding slogans of 'a free democracy'?" he asked. 
Hromadka viewed the changes in eastern europe not simply as Soviet machinations but 
also as expressions of resentment against reactionary regimes. "There exists the grave danger 
that the western democracies are -- justly of wrongly -- identified with social and political 
reaction, and that they will lose all political and moral authority." He found it tragic that 
western nations are united in nothing more than "anti-Communism.' The west desperately 
needs to recover its humane heritage, and, if it does, the whole world will benefit." 
He felt that Westerners have serious misunderstandings about the Soviet Union and 
eastern European countries. There are times, he said, where nations need strong governments 
in order to bring about social transformation. Nations with no democratic experience cannot 
be judged by democratic standards. For many people social equality and liberation from 
poverty take precedence over personal freedoms, at least for this time. Furthermore, 
Communism is not to be put on the same level as Nazism. It has a concern for the poor and 
a constructive social program. "What I have in mind is to interpret the dictatorial regime of 
the Soviet system as a historical necessity in a country consisting of multiple ethnic, and in 
the past culturally backward elements, and in a nation which for many reasons had not been 
privileged to enjoy political liberties and popular education." This statement makes 
interesting reading in 1990 when ethnic rivalries are tearing the Soviet Union apart.' 
While not agreeing with dialectical materialism, Hromadka saw it as a .  useful unifying 
factor for the time being, but he also foresaw the possibility of change in the dominant 
ideology. "The Marxian and Leninian ideology has penetrated into all realms of the social 
and cultural activity. However, after the new social and political order has been thoroughly 
rooted and entrenched and adequately secured, and after the 180 millions of Soviet citizens 
have been educated and come of age, the official ideology will undoubtedly undergo--as it 
actually is undergoing--a process of transformation from within." This transformation could 
come about because of the heritage of thought expressed in the writings of such men as 
Tolstoy and Dostoyevsky. The Russian Orthodox Church, too, he thought, despite its 
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limitations and restrictions, could be one of the channels of potential spiritual regeneration 
of the nation. 
Like Dulles, Hromadka felt that the best contribution the West could make would be to 
be true to its heritage. Reliance on profits and atomic bombs is hardly adequate. Capitalism 
by itself cannot meet human needs. "Freedom and political liberties without social security 
and a new, more organic fellowship of man are, today meaningless." 
While expressing his concerns about the West's failures to live up to its heritage, 
Hromadka expressed his misgivings about Soviet expansionism, about the philosophy of 
historical materialism, and about the dangers that this materialism brings to the human 
personality and freedom. He called the church to exert her spiritual influence upon the 
materialism on both sides of the political division. 
Looking now in retrospect upon the "prophecies" of both speakers, one has to 
acknowledge that both men showed considerable insight. Both saw, for example, that the 
churches could be influential in providing a deeper perspective on world affairs and in 
serving as a reconciling agency. The churches have not been as effective as they might have 
been due to the increasing secularization of the modern world and due to their declining 
influence. But they did make a contribution. In spite of various difficulties churches on 
both sides of the iron curtain have remained in contact with each other through confessional 
and ecumenical world bodies and have maintained a sense of solidarity through prayers, aid, 
and fellowship. One thinks, for example, of the strong contacts between churches of East 
and West Germany and of the extensive peace action that has taken place in both countries. 
Likewise, one can point to the visitation of Russian Orthodox Church leaders to western 
churches and vice versa. Or one can mention the churches' insistence that the western 
emphasis on civil and political rights needs to be supplemented by the eastern emphasis on 
economic and social rights. 
Both Dulles and Hromadka foresaw the possibility of a change in Communism. 
Hromadka saw it more clearly. He lived to see the Prague Spring of 1 968, but he died a 
disillusioned man after the Warsaw Pact invasion crushed the "socialism with a human face" 
advocated by Alexander Dubcek. It took twenty more years before the real changes took 
place. 
Neither speaker foresaw that the change would come about because of the inherent 
inefficiency of a system that combines totalitarianism with socialism. It may be, though, that 
this was what Dulles had in mind when he spoke of the western system proving itself to be 
superior. Dulles did expect the change to come as a result of competition from the West. 
Hromadka saw the change coming about due to new political thinking within the Soviet 
Union. No doubt the current changes are results of both pressure from without and change 
of thought within. 
40 
Dulles expected the ultimate victory of western values ·because they were based on the 
"moral law." It would be perilous to attribute the current western political victory entirely 
to western moral superiority. The West has supported corrupt, reactionary regimes and has 
placed much reliance on armaments. But it is apparent that many people of the Communist 
lands have yearned for the western spiritual values even if the West did not live up to them. 
At the same time it is also apparent that many people in those lands were primarily interested 
in the economic prosperity of the west. 
Hromadka expected a great and lasting influence of the Soviet social experiment on other 
nations. Things did not turn out that way. For some years many Third World people 
admired the Soviet Union and found its system more appropriate for developing countries 
than the western system, but that admiration did not last. China, too, was an important 
model for awhile. Today most Third World nations are looking to the West for support even 
though in many cases they are critical of it. 
Dulles hoped that the United NAtions would help to advert wars and that it would bring 
about great advances in regard to respect for human rights. There have been numerous wars 
since the U.N. was founded, though some were adverted or ended with U.N. help. The U.N. 
could not enforce human rights. Still, the emphasis on human rights has increased all over 
the world. Public opinion and economic pressures have helped to dethrone many violators, 
whether they be tyrants such as Marcos or advocates of apartheid. 
Neither Dulles or Hromadka anticipated the crisis in population, ecology, or the nuclear 
arms race. These were to become dominant threats in later years. 
Both of them manifested a desire for philosophy that would provide a unity for society. 
Dulles looked for a revitalization of western values, a religion of democracy to be a unifying 
factor for the time being, even thought he recognized the falsity of much of the theory. 
While Dulles placed no faith in the Soviet system because it violated moral law, Hromadka 
placed too much faith in it, engaging at times of wishful thinking. Today dialectical 
materialism is no longer a unifying philosophy. In Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union 
nationalism is a far stronger force than dialectical materialism; in some ares religion is 
stronger than it. What can be said about a unifying philosophy in the western world? It 
received a severe jolt in the Vietnam era. To some extent it can be seen in the shared values 
of the western alliance, but anti-Communism has also been a factor holding western nations 
together. Perhaps the future will tell more clearly to what degree a faith in democracy is a 
strong unifying philosophy. 
Dulles saw some value in the challenge that comes from the Communist countries to 
western nations in the competition for the minds of world's peoples. One wonders where the 
challenge and competition will come from now. Will the nations of the north be less 
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interested in the nations of the south? Who will now present an effective challenge to the 
excesses of capitalism and neo-colonialism? 
In each moment of history Christians need to discern the signs of the times and to seek 
God's will for national and international affairs. Dulles and Hromadka shared their best 
insights into the events of their time and many of these have proved to be valid. With the 
end of the cold war an epoch has ended. Now we need new insights for the present and for 
the period ahead. 
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